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COMMENTS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, COLLECTIVE CHOICE
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his article Professor Cass demonstrates an impressive breadth
of knowledge and thought on the subject of the first amendment
and its application to commercial speech. Professor Cass provides a
useful and concise summary of the various theories for interpretation of the Constitution, including the "negative theory" espoused
by himself and others, and the law and economics theory espoused
by Richard Posner.' Cass embraces much of Posner's economic
analysis for the purposes of policy analysis as to what the Constitution ought to say, while adhering to the negative theory of constitutional interpretation to determine what the Constitution in fact says.
Professor Cass finds that, with respect to the first amendment, there
is a rough coincidence among our judicial tradition, the negative
theory and Posner's law and economics theory. 2 In particular, with
respect to commercial speech, current Supreme Court doctrine, the
negative theory and Posner's law and economics theory, all agree
that while there may be some first amendment protection for commercial speech, that protection should be less than the protection
afforded political, artistic or scientific speech. 3 Accordingly, Professor Cass concludes that the Court's recent decisions with respect to
commercial speech are in keeping with constitutional history and
precedent, as interpreted by the negative theory, and with sound
4
policy analysis, as represented by the law and economics theory.
While I find much to agree with in what Professor Cass has written, I would argue for amendment and clarification of Posner's economic model before fully embracing it as a sound basis for policy
analysis. I believe that Professor Cass' preference for the negative
* Assistant Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Cincinnati College
of Law; Ph.D. in Economics, University of Michigan, 1984; J.D., University of Michigan
Law School, 1981. I would like to thank Beth Wayne for her research assistance and
Gordon Christenson for his helpful comments.
1. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317,
1321-53 (1988).
2. Id. at 1332, 1359-60
3. Id. at 1320, 1334.
4. Id. at 1320, 1382. This statement is a simplification of Professor Cass'
conclusion. Undoubtedly his belief that the Court's current commercial speech doctrine
is founded on sound analysis is based on theories beyond Posner's law and economics
theory.
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theory over Posner's economic theory to provide positive answers in
the interpretation of the Constitution is soundly based on the value
of precedent and predictability in constitutional interpretation.
This value has not yet been incorporated into Posner's economic
theory of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, I believe that it is
very important under an economic analysis of constitutional rights
whether the objective function to be maximized is a social welfare
function, as espoused by Professor Cass, 5 or wealth as has been
used by Professor Posner in some of his previous work. 6 The adoption of the wealth maximization criterion implicitly assumes the appropriateness of the current distribution of property for the
purposes of allocating constitutional rights. This assumption is inconsistent with our tradition, cited by Professor Cass, 7 of allocating
constitutional rights based on an egalitarian balancing of competing
interests. Finally, I agree with Professors Cass and Posner that economic analysis suggests that it is appropriate that commercial
speech receive less first amendment protection than political, artistic
or scientific speech. However, while Posner and Cass' arguments
focus primarily on the social costs of regulating speech, I would extend the economic arguments to the social benefits side of the costbenefit analysis. I would argue that government regulation of commercial speech can yield more social benefits than government regulation of political speech because the government can act as an
effective guarantor of the truthfulness of commercial speech, but
suffers from a fundamental conflict of interest in guaranteeing the
truthfulness of political speech. Additional arguments can be made
as to the greater social benefits of the regulation of commercial
speech over the regulation of artistic or scientific speech.
II.

THE VALUE OF DOCUMENTATION AND PRECEDENT

Professor Cass begins his analysis with a lengthy outline and discussion of interpretivist and non-interpretivist theories for discerning the meaning of the Constitution. 8 Interpretivist theorists
answer questions concerning the meaning of the Constitution by referring to general principles they derive from the text of the Constitution, its history and judicial precedent. Non-interpretivist theorists
5. Id. at 1330-31. Cass attributes the adoption of a social welfare function as the
objective function to Posner. Id. Since it is unclear to me whether the objective function
in Posner's work is a social welfare function or wealth, I attribute this clarification of the

economic model to Cass.
6. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15, 230, 241 (3d ed. 1986); Posner,
Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-36 (1979).

7. Cass, supra note 1, at 1332.
8. Id. at 1322-53.
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answer questions concerning the meaning of the Constitution by
reference to general principles that they develop independently of
the text, history and precedent of the Constitution, 9 but which they
believe ought to be represented in the Constitution.
Among the interpretivist theories is Professor Cass' own favorite,
the "negative theory" of the Constitution. Under this theory one
should: examine the constitutional document, history and precedent; determine the problems with which the framers and prior courts
were concerned, and their solutions; and apply analogous solutions
to current problems, keeping as true as possible to the evidence of
the original meaning of the Constitution and the applicable
precedent.l°
Among the non-interpretivist theories is Professor Posner's economic theory. As interpreted by Professor Cass this theory states
that the Constitution should allow only that regulation of individual
rights for which the benefits of the regulation exceed its cost, with
benefits and costs both measured in terms of social welfare.' t The
objective of the theory is to maximize social welfare, which, when
one adopts a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, amounts
to the maximization of the total utility enjoyed by all members of
society.
Professor Cass accepts most of Posner's economic arguments as
public policy arguments as to what the Constitution ought to say,
but prefers the negative theory to determine what the Constitution
in fact says. The question is how to reconcile these positions. If in
fact Posner has developed a workable theory of the Constitution
based on the maximization of social welfare, why do Professor Cass
and other interpretivist theorists cling to historical documents and
precedent? Do they not care about social welfare, or is there some
value in anchoring constitutional interpretation in documentation
and precedent? Professor Cass gives us two arguments on the value
of documentation and precedent, one of which I do not agree with,
and the other which I believe goes to the heart of the matter.
The first argument is that it is valuable to discern the original
meaning of the Constitution because it is a document that was
drafted in greater accord with the general social welfare than other
9. A non-interpretivist may of course cite precedent or the Constitution's text or
history when they support the principle which the theorist has adopted. However, for
the non-interpretivist the meaning of the Constitution's text depends upon the
principles which the theorist believes should be upheld, rather than the principles
depending on precedent or the Constitution's text or history.
10. Cass, supra note 1, at 1351.
11. See id. at 1329-31.
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documents, such as contracts or statutes.' 2 The argument is Rawlsian: since a constitution is drafted to cover a longer period of time
and a greater number of circumstances than other documents, its
framers write from a perspective of greater uncertainty as to how a
particular provision will affect their future self-interest and thus
must draft it less in accord with their own narrow self interests and
more in accord with the general social welfare. I agree that the Constitution was probably drafted more in accord with the general social welfare than most other documents, but disagree that this is a
reason why discerning the original meaning of the Constitution is
valuable. It seems to me that the Rawlsian argument applies equally
well to the drafting of the original document or to its later interpretation by the Supreme Court. Whether a drafter or a Supreme Court
Justice pens a new provision of the Constitution, both would be
working under equal uncertainty as to how the provision would affect their own narrow self-interest and thus would be inclined to
shape the provision in the interest of the general social welfare.
The second argument is that courts should use interpretive methods in discerning the meaning of the Constitution to increase judicial predictability.1 3 Judicial decisions generally apply retroactively,
and consequently allow limited opportunity for affected parties to
respond. Thus it is particularly important that judicial decisions be
predictable to allow the affected parties to efficiently plan their affairs. This argument seems correct. Interpretivist methods, which
are grounded in documents, history and precedent, would seem
more exactly defined and predictable in their application than noninterpretivist methods grounded in general principle. Even if the
general principle of a non-interpretivist method could be stated in
terms as exact as the documents, history and precedent of the interpretivist method, the objective of the principle, for instance what
constitutes social welfare, may change over time while the documentation, history and precedent remain unchanged. This static quality
of interpretive methods adds to their predictability. The value of
predictability and the corresponding costs of uncertainty in the
planning of future affairs has long been recognized in the economic
literature. 14
It seems that Professor Cass and the other interpretivists have
identified a value in documentation and precedent which has not yet
been accounted for in Posner's model of constitutional interpreta12. Id. at 1348-49.
13. Id. at 1349-50.
14. See J. DREZE,
(1987).

ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC

DECISIONS

UNDER UNCERTAINTY

322-23
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tion. 15 The problem is that Posner's model evaluates the optimal
set of constitutional rights from a static perspective rather than a
dynamic perspective. 16 As a result, Posner's model does not examine the value of reducing uncertainty in people's planning or the
fact that the satisfied desires that constitute social welfare may
change over time. 1 7 Query whether an economic model based on
the general principle of the maximization of social welfare, but accounting for the value of documentation and precedent in that maximization process, would be an interpretivist or a non-interpretivist
theory?
III.

WEALTH MAXIMIZATION VERSUS SOCIAL
WELFARE MAXIMIZATION

Professor Cass argues that Posner's economic model arrives at a
balancing formula which is more consistent with our judicial tradition than other non-interpretivist theories of the first amendment.
This is because Posner's theory, which is based on the individual
interests and values of the members of society, allows "the sort of
balancing of competing interests that has characterized the courts'
approach to first amendment cases.' ' This is true only if the eco15. There has been some work on the value of precedent in the law and economics
literature. E.g., Cooter and Kornhauser, Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of
Precedent, 10 BELL J. EcON. 366 (1979). In fact, although the value of precedent is not
accounted for in his work on the first amendment, Professor Posner has been one of the
primary contributors to this literature. E.g., Landes and Posner, Legal Precedent: A
Theoreticaland Empirical Analysis, 19J. L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
16. This is no great condemnation of Posner's model. It is not unusual for economic
models to begin with a simple static analysis and progress to a dynamic analysis.
17. A simple outline of the dynamic portion of an economic model of constitutional
interpretation might be built on the following assumptions: that people benefit both
from predictability in their constitutional rights and from the correct determination of
the socially optimal set, of constitutional rights by courts; that the socially optimal set of
constitutional rights can be determined and that it changes over time; that the courts'
determination of the socially optimal set of constitutional rights can be changed by the
amendment process or judicial fiat; and that, due to transaction costs, judicial fiat is
sometimes a more efficient means of changing the Constitution than the amendment
process. Under such a set of assumptions a court would maximize social welfare by
following the Constitution's text, history and precedent, even when these sources are
inconsistent with the evolving set or socially optimal constitutional rights, so long as the
benefits of predictability in planning outweighed the costs of deviation from the set of
socially optimal constitutional rights. In this model if the set of socially optimal
constitutional rights were evolving consistently in a liberal direction, conservatives
would become "strict constructionists" and if this set were evolving consistently in a
conservative direction, liberals would become "strict constructionists." Society might
regulate the speed with which precedent followed the evolution of the socially optimal
set of rights by alternately electing liberal and conservative presidents to appoint liberal
and conservative judges.
18. Cass, supra note 1, at 1332.
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nomic model takes as its objective social welfare maximization as
opposed to wealth maximization. Social welfare is a broad-based
concept in which the valuation of a right depends on people's utility
in the exercise of that right and each person's utility may be given

equal weight. Wealth maximization is a constrained form of social
welfare maximization in which the valuation of a right depends on
people's willingness and ability to pay for that right and each person's utility is weighed in proportion to their wealth. As a result, the
objective of social welfare maximization is consistent with the egalitarian balancing of competing interests which has characterized the
allocation of rights under our constitutional tradition, while the objective of wealth maximization would favor the rich, allowing them
to "out bid" others for constitutional rights, in contradiction of our
constitutional tradition.19
From Posner's article on the first amendment 20 it is unclear to me
exactly what values he believes we should attempt to maximize in
interpreting the Constitution. Posner speaks only in terms of "ben-

efits" and "costs" or "harms" without identifying whether these
benefits and costs are measured according to increases and de-

creases in the hypothetical social welfare function or market values
21
appropriate to a determination of the maximization of wealth.
Professor Cass assumes that Posner seeks to maximize a BergsonSamuelson social welfare function and cites several of Posner's
19. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (statute which imposes a fine, but
mandates imprisonment if the defendant is unable to pay, held unconstitutional);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel cannot be denied
indigents); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in a criminal
proceeding not dependent on ability to pay); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state
may not grant appellate review in a manner that discriminates against convicted
defendants due to their poverty); see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941)
(C.J. Jackson, concurring) ("we should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's
mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his
rights as a citizen of the United States"). Even though wealth is not a suspect
classification under the equal protection clause, San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the government's allocation of fundamental
rights is subjected to strict scrutiny under that clause, United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-23 n.4 (1938). Wealth-based classifications for the
purpose of allocating fundamental rights do not survive equal protection analysis.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state's conditioning of the
right to vote on payment of fee or tax violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment); Lane v. Brown 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (state limitations on the
right to appeal based on the wealth of appellant violate the equal protection clause);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (same).
20. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SurF. U.L.R. 1 (1986).
21. Id. at 8-54. In fairness to Professor Posner, his failure to exactly define these
values may be because he is writing for a broad audience for whom the subtleties of such
a distinction might be confusing.
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works in support of this assumption. 22 Professor Cass' assumption
may be right, but in many of his works Professor Posner has advocated the use of wealth maximization as a proxy for social welfare
maximization or as an independent value for the allocation of legal
rights. 23 Professor Cass himself goes on to cite a wealth maximizing
rule as the guideline for the social welfare maximizing legal decision. 24 A simple example will demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between social welfare maximization and wealth
maximization and the inappropriateness of the later to constitutional interpretation. But first I will distinguish these concepts.
The concept of social welfare derives from the classical utilitarian
or Benthamite tradition. 2 5 In accordance with this tradition it is assumed that each individual experiences a certain amount of utility
from each possible distribution of legal entitlements, such as property26 or the right of free speech, and that these individual utilities
can be summed across all members of society in one social welfare
function. To maximize social welfare, society, through its legislature and courts, selects the distribution of entitlements that leads to
the greatest sum total of utility. Thus, if the maximization of social
welfare is the objective of society, the Constitution should be interpreted to uphold regulations of speech that increase social welfare
by adding more to total utility than they subtract from total utility.
Posner defines wealth as the value, in dollars, of everything in society, based on people's willingness to pay. 27 Under Posner's wealth
maximization hypothesis, society should allocate legal entitlements
to their most "valuable" uses. Society can generally count on competitive markets to perform this function, but where a market fails
due to transaction costs, courts should "mimic" the market and
award the entitlement to the party that would have purchased it in
the marketplace absent transaction costs. 28 Thus, if wealth maximization is the objective of society, the Constitution should be interpreted to uphold regulations of speech that would be maintained
in costless market transactions among the affected parties.
One such transaction might be that wealthy people would pay
poor people to adhere to a regulation of silence on political matters.
If the transaction costs of having all rich people and poor people
22. Cass, supra note 1, at 1330-3 1.
23. For examples of Posner's use of the wealth maximization criterion, see the.
sources cited in supra note 6.
24. Cass, supra note 1, at 1332-33.
25. J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
26. As used in this section, the term "property" refers to personal or real property.
27. Posner, Utilitarianism,supra note 6, at 119.
28. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 230.

1390

CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

negotiate such an arrangement prevented this transaction and the
government stepped in and passed a law prohibiting poor people
from voicing political opinions, a judge applying Posner's wealth
maximization criterion would allocate the entitlement of the poor's
free speech to those who most valued it, the rich, and uphold the
statute as constitutional. Such an interpretation is of course inimicable to our conception of first amendment protections under the
Constitution. Political speech in a public forum can only be subjected to reasonable restrictions as to time, place, and manner.
Prohibiting speech based on content or because it is made by an
29
identified class violates the first amendment.
The problem is that the objective of wealth maximization only ensures the maximization of utility between the parties to the transaction and only maximizes their utility given the current distribution
of property. 30 As a result, it is a poor proxy for social welfare maximization in determining the allocation of legal entitlements. For
instance, it may be that, although the purchase of the poor's right to
speak by the rich may increase the sum total of utility between those
two groups, there may be a third group, the middle class, who suffer
a loss of utility from not hearing the poor's opinions. Due to such
externalities of consumption, one cannot be sure that even a voluntary market transaction increases the sum total of utility for all members of society thereby increasing social welfare. 3 ' Additionally, it
may be that, although the poor would voluntarily sell their right to
speak given the current distribution of property, if property were
redistributed to maximize social welfare and the poor gained prop29. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (having created a public forum open
to students, university could not enforce content-based regulation to exclude religious
groups); Linmark Associated, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(ordinance restricting yard signs must be content-neutral); Madison Joint School District
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (in public forum
government may not discriminate among speakers based on their employment or the
content of their speech).
30. There is another problem with Posner's rule for assigning entitlements based on
the maximization of wealth in that he does not require the compensation of those people
who do not receive the entitlement but who would have been compensated in the
market transaction. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: PhilosophicAspects of the
Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 237, 241-42 (1980) . In the example at
hand the poor would have received money for their silence in their hypothetical market
transaction with the rich, but receive nothing under the statute prohibiting their speech.
31. The Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function traditionally assumes that there
are no externalities of consumption among the members of the society. Samuelson,
Reaffirming the Existence of Reasonable Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions, 44
ECONOMETRICA 81 (1977). This seems a questionable assumption when discussing a
good such as speech which, in many circumstances, is a public good. It would be more
appropriate to adopt a more primitive Benthamite social welfare function for the
analysis of questions concerning entitlements to free speech.
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erty, they might refuse to sell their right to speak, or might even pay
the rich to remain silent. Market mimicry tells us the social welfare
maximizing allocation of entitlements only if we are willing to assume that the current distribution of property maximizes social
32
welfare.
Whether it is social welfare or some other ideal which one might
seek to optimize in deciding the allocation of constitutional rights,
our Constitution should and does require a more egalitarian basis
for the allocation of rights than the maximization of wealth. All too
often, a person's willingness to pay for an entitlement depends on
his or her ablity to pay. The idea that a person's constitutional
rights should depend on his or her ability, to bid for those rights is
contrary to our constitutional tradition.
IV.

EXTENSION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL: THE
GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTOR

With the recognition that Posner's model is a static model and the
qualification that its proper objective should be the maximization of
social welfare, I find much to agree with in Professors Posner and
Cass' economic arguments. I agree that commercial speech is less
of a public good than political, artistic or scientific speech and there33 I
fore is more resilient and less readily "chilled" by regulation.
also agree that the social costs of regulation are lower with commercial speech than political, artistic or scientific speech. It is easier and
cheaper to determine whether commercial advertising is false or
misleading with respect to the price, quantity or quality of the good
offered for sale than it is to determine whether political, artistic or
scientific speech is false or misleading. 34 Moreover, it seems plausible that the government would be less likely to "mistakenly" repress
true speech in the regulation of commercial speech than in the regulation of political speech because the government is less partisan
with respect to commercial speech.3 5 Accordingly, I agree that,
ceteris paribus, it makes sense from a public policy perspective to allow greater government regulation of commercial speech, especially
false commercial speech, than political, artistic or scientific
32. This fact also means that application of the wealth maximization criterion to the
determination of property entitlements is tautological.
33. Cass, supra note 1, at 1368; Posner, supra note 20, at 40.
34. Cass, supra note 1, at 1370-7 1: Posner, supra note 20, at 39-40.
35. Although Posner does not discuss the relative impartiality of government with
respect to commercial speech he does mention that government partiality with respect
to political speech may add to the legal error costs of regulation ceteris paiibus by
increasing the amount of truthful speech repressed. Posner, supra note 20, at 25. Cass
discusses this problem as an agency cost problem. Cass, supra note 1, at 1355-56.
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speech. 3 6 However, these arguments examine only the relative social costs of the regulation of commercial speech and the regulation
of political, artistic or scientific speech. I would extend the argument to the benefits side of Posner's cost-benefit analysis and argue
that society can derive greater social benefits from the regulation of
commercial speech than the regulation of political, artistic or scientific speech because the government can act as an effective guaran37
tor of the former, but not of the later.
A "seller" of commercial or political "goods" may have incentive
to deceive his or her customers with respect to certain qualities of
those goods, in particular qualities which can best be discovered by
the consumer through experience-for instance the safety, efficiency or durability of a product, or whether a candidate really has a
secret plan to end the Vietnam War. 38 If a producer can mislead
consumers in a way that can be discovered only after the consumer
has purchased the good, the producer can increase his or her profits
by selling a cheaper and inferior product, or candidate, to consumers. Not all producers will adopt this strategy, and in fact some producers may make a point of never lying to consumers in order to
cultivate trust and loyalty. However, realizing producers' incentive
to lie, a consumer would be foolish to fully believe all producer
claims. The result is that society cannot fully benefit from the resources spent on advertising because some are spent to mislead
consumers into wasteful purchases and the value of the remainder,
even though spent on truthful advertising, is diminished since rational consumers discount the truthfulness of the advertisements.
One solution to this problem, at least with respect to commercial
advertising, is to have the government act as the guarantor of the
truthfulness of the advertising. The government can do this by
prohibiting false advertising and testing products to ensure that
they live up to advertising claims. Economies of scale can be realized by having the government conduct product tests on behalf of
all consumers rather than having each consumer purchase a product
36. I accept these arguments only as public policy arguments as to what a
constitution which maximized social welfare might say. I venture no opinion as to the
correct documentary and historical interpretation of our actual Constitution.
37. Posner and Cass do discuss the benefits side of the cost-benefit analysis. Posner,
supra note 20, at 29, 40; Cass, supra note 1, at 1369; see also Cass, The Perils of Positive
Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, UCLA L. REV.

(forthcoming) (material accompanying notes 167 and 168). However, their arguments
with respect to commercial speech focus primarily on the costs of regulation. I seek to
add a further argument concerning the relative benefits of regulating commercial speech
and regulating political, artistic or scientific speech.
38. See Nelson, Comments on Advertising and Free Speech, in ADVERTISING AND FREE
SPEECH

49, 53-54 (A. Hyman and M. Johnson eds. 1977).
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to discover whether it performs as advertised. 39 Moreover, if the
government adequately polices the truthfulness of advertising, consumers can fully rely on advertising claims in making their
purchases. As a result, society would realize social benefit from all
its advertising expenditures because resources would no longer be
spent to mislead consumers into purchasing products they do not
want and society would fully realize the benefit of the resources
used for truthful advertising because consumers would no longer
40
have to discount the claims of advertisers.
However, the government cannot act as a credible guarantor of
political speech. The problem is that the government is a producer
of political "goods" and has the same incentives to mislead consumers about the qualities of their goods, or their competitors' goods,
as the other producers of political goods. 41 The government might
even go so far as to attempt to obtain a competitive advantage in the
marketplace of political goods by banning the views of their competitors. The government's fundamental conflict of interest with respect to the regulation of political speech prevents society from
realizing economies of scale or the full benefit of advertising resources through the regulation of political speech. Thus, ceteris
paribus, one would expect the social benefits from the regulation of
commercial speech to be higher than the social benefits from the
regulation of political speech and could argue that affording com-

39. These economies of scale might also be exploited by private independent
consumer testing services that would be developed to meet this need. However, the
problem of people "free-riding" on the information produced by such services would
seem to insure that the private sector would never provide an adequate amount of these
services.
40. If consumers no longer had to discount advertising statements, producers too
would realize an increased benefit from truthful advertising and one would expect that
more resources would be committed to truthful advertising. The amount of resources
dedicated to advertising might fall, rise, or stay the same depending on whether the
increase in truthful advertising is less than, greater than, or equal to the decrease in
untruthful advertising.
41. The fact that the government has a fundamental conflict of interest with respect
to the regulation of political speech has been well recognized in the legal literature. The
argument is usually stated in terms of free speech being necessary to the functioning of a
democratic government. See generally A. Meikeljohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment (1948); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978) ; Bork, Nentral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). This fundamental conflict has been

largely ignored in the law and economics literature and is glaringly absent from Coase's
work on the first amendment.

See generally Coase, Advertising and Free Speech in
38, at 1-31; Coase, The Economics of the First
Amendment: The Marketfor Goods and the Marketfor Ideas, 64 AMER. ECON. R. 384 (1974).
ADVERTISING AND

FREE SPEECH, supra note
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mercial speech less constitutional protection than political speech
42
maximizes social welfare.
This same argument cannot apply in differentiating commercial
speech from artistic and scientific speech. There is no obvious conflict of interest in the government regulation of artistic or scientific
speech. Moreover, it may be that the government's determination
of whether commercial speech is false and should be repressed may
turn on its determination of whether certain scientific speech is
false. For instance, a cigarette manufacturer may advertise that
smoking its brand is less likely to cause lung cancer than smoking
other popular brands, and have scientific studies and opinions to
support this claim. Are there social benefit arguments to distinguish
the regulation of commercial advertising from the regulation of artistic or scientific speech?
Professor Posner has given us a cursory statement of such an argument. He argues that a distinction between commercial speech
and artistic or scientific speech can be made on the basis of the intended audience. 43 Commercial speech is intended for the public at
large who, since we are not all skilled scientists, might benefit from a
determination by government scientists that the manufacturer's scientific claim is reasonably grounded in sound scientific research.
Artistic and scientific speech is intended, respectively, for artists and
scientists who would benefit little, if any, from a government determination on the soundness of the speech. Ofcourse artists or scientists may also seek to communicate their ideas directly to the public.
An artist may build a statue in his front yard or a scientist may write
a letter to the local newspaper to warn the public that there is evidence that smoking causes lung cancer and death. But with respect
to artistic speech, one can readily argue that the public is more expert as to its artistic tastes and values than any government official.
In fact, since artistic values are so subjective, it seems doubtful the
government could ever beneficially regulate art aside from the prohibition of obscenity. 44 With respect to scientific speech, where
42. This "benefits" argument is distinct from Posner's argument that the partisan
nature of government would add to the legal error costs of the regulation of political
speech because a partisan government might repress truthful speech with which it did
not agree. Posner, supra note 20, at 25. The repression of truthful speech by a partisan
government is rightly categorized as a cost of regulation by Posner. My arguments go to
the benefits of government regulation in removing untruthful speech from the public
forum. These benefits consist of the realization of economies of scale in the testing of
the truthfulness of speech and the allowance of greater reliance on the speech that is not
repressed.
43. Posner, supra note 20, at 40.
44. Posner argues that obscenity yields negative net social benefits. Posner, supra
note 20, at 44-45.
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public opinions are not driven by commercial interests, Posner believes there are adequate incentives and resources for other scientists to contradict false or unfounded scientific claims and there
45
would be little benefit to government regulation.
Thus it seems that, in addition to the arguments espoused by
Professors Posner and Cass that the social costs of regulation of
commercial speech are less than the social costs of regulating political, artistic or scientific speech, there are arguments that the social
benefits from the regulation of commercial speech exceed those
from the regulation of political, artistic or scientific speech. The
lesser protection afforded commercial speech under the first amendment makes sense from both sides of the cost-benefit analysis in the
maximization of social welfare.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Cass is correct that the Supreme Court's current doctrine affording commercial speech less first amendment protection
than political, artistic or scientific speech is consistent with sound
economic analysis. Professor Cass' formulation of the economic
model with the objective of the maximization of social welfare is
consistent with the egalitarian allocation of constitutional rights
which marks our constitutional tradition. Application of the economic model suggests that the social costs of regulating commercial
speech are lower than the social costs of regulating political, artistic
or scientific speech and that the social benefits of regulating commercial speech are higher than the social benefits of regulating
political, artistic or scientific speech. Accordingly, it is consistent
with the maximization of social welfare to give less constitutional
protection to commercial speech. Even the precedential value with
which the Court's opinions are imbued is consistent with economic
analysis if that analysis takes account of the value of predictability in
the efficient ordering of people's affairs. However, further work in
the refinement and clarification of the economic theory of constitutional interpretation is needed.
45. Id. at 40.

